Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear Online	version	at Critique August	19, 2014 Stefanie	Grüne's	book, Blinde	Anschauung, is	a	rich, deep, and	wonderfully	concise examination	of	issues	pertaining	to	Kant's	theory	of	cognition	in	general, and	his	view on	perception	in	particular. In	the	course	of	articulating	her	argument, she	does	a	great deal	to	advance	our	understanding	of	the	structure	of	Kant's	views	on	cognition, the nuance	and	variety	of	positions	he	expresses	(concerning	which	she	provides	a	heroic amount	of	clarification	and	regimentation), and	their	ultimate	unity	and	coherence. In what	follows	I focus	on	only	a	limited	part	of	the	area	that	she	covers, and	primarily only	on	aspects	of	her	positive	view. First, however, I provide	some	summary	of	relevant portions	of	Grüne's	argument. 1 The	Inconsistent	Triad Grüne	argues	(17)	that	there	are	sound	textual	grounds	for	reading	Kant	as	endorsing an	inconsistent	triad	of	positions:1 1. The Independence	Thesis concerning	the	independence	of	sensibility	from	understanding • Intuitions	and	concepts	are	representations, for	which	two	distinct	cognitive capacities	are	responsible. Sensibility	provides	intuitions. The	understanding	provides	concepts. 2. The Genetic	Primacy	of	Intuition	Thesis • The	understanding	can	only	construct	concepts	under	the	condition	that sensibility	has	previously	provided	intuitions 3. The Genetic	Primacy	of	Concepts	Thesis • Sensibility	provides	intuition	only	in	cooperation	with	the	understanding. Intuitions	arise	only	when	one	already	possesses	concepts, which	function as	rules	for	the	sensible	synthesis	of	sensory	representations	into	intuitions 1 I cite	Kant's	works	parenthetically	in	the	text	according	to	the Akademie edition	and	page	number, with the	first Critique cited	according	to	the	standard	A/B pagination. Grüne's	book	is	also	cited	parenthetically	by	page	number. All	other	citations	are	in	footnotes. 1 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear Grüne	sees	non-conceptualist	readings	as	rejecting	(3), and	conceptualist	readings	as rejecting	(2), or	(in	the	case	of	ginsborg2006)	arguing	that	there	is	no	primacy	claim	in Kant	at	all. Grüne's	solution	is	to	say	that	we	need	to	distinguish	different	ways	in	which a	concept	or	intuition	might	have	primacy. Her	proposal	is	that	Kant	posits	a	distinction	between	obscure	(dunkel)	concepts, clear	(klar)	concepts, and	distinct	(deutlich) concepts. Obscure	concepts	are	genetically	prior to	intuition, but	clear	and	distinct concepts	are	not. The	possession	conditions	for	obscure	concepts	are	extremely	liberal. This	allows	Grüne	to	articulate	an	intermediary	position	between	traditional	forms	of conceptualism	and	non-conceptualism. On	the	one	side, she	can	recognize	the	(in	one sense)	primitive	nature	of	intuition. On	the	other	side	she	can	show	that	conceptual capacities	are	necessary	for	having	any	intuitions	at	all. This	position	thus	encompasses a	wide	variety	of	texts	and	seemingly	harmonizes	the	two	strongest	forces	in	the	opposing	interpretive	stances	towards	Kant's	cognitive	theory, providing	a	version	of	conceptualism	("obscure	conceptualism)	that	has	much	in	common	with	non-conceptualism, seemingly	without	its	supposed	vices. 2 Grüne	on	Intuition Grüne thinks that	all	empirical intuitions	are	generated	by	means	of	a	synthesis	performed	on	purely	subjective	sensory	states	(equivalent	to	"raw	feels"	such	as	pains	or pleasures). (40f, 63	note	62, 153	note	8). Intuitions	are	conscious	(39)	objective	representations	(40-1)	that	are	inherently	complex	(61, 70)	and	may	be	had	independently	of	the	existence	of	any	object	they	might represent	(42-3). The	conscious	character	of intuition is	understood	specifically in terms	of clarity. An	intuition	is	clear	when	it	allows	the	subject	to	distinguish	the	object	occupying	one spatial	or	temporal	region	from	another, be	it	another	object, or	simply	another	part	of the	subject's	environment	(74, 81). The	objective	character	of	an intuition is	understood in terms its	being	a	kind	of intentional	state (40). Grüne	bases	this	claim	on	the	canonical	"Stufenleiter"	passage in	which	Kant	distinguishes	different	types	of	representation	(A320/B376–7). However, she	also	cites	(41)	an	important	note	from	Kant's Nachlass where	he	says, What	is	an	object? That	whose	representation	is	a	sum	of	several	predicates belonging	to	it. The	plate	is	round, warm, made	of	tin, etc. Warm, round, being	made	of	tin, etc., are	not	objects, although	the	warmth, the	tin, etc., indeed	[are]. An	object	is	that	in	the	representation	of	which	various	others can	be	thought	as	synthetically	combined...	(R6350, 18:676) 2 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear According	to	Grüne, relation	to	an	object	thus	consists	in	the	representation	of	particular features	as	unified	in	one	subject. Neither	this	subject	(nor	its	features)	need	exist	(42-3). If intuitions	may	be	had	independently	of	the	existence	of	their	objects, we	need some	characterization	of	how	we	determine	what	an	intuition	is	an	intuition of. This, Grüne	argues, is	done	by	means	of the content of	the	intuition. Intuitions	represent their	objects	via	"marks"	understood in terms	of the intentional	content	of	a	mental state (53). The	content	of intuition	consists	of "intuitive	marks"	glossed in terms	of the	representation	of	tropes	(65-71), singular	features	which	only	one	object	may	have. Thus, the	central	difference	between	the	content	of	an	intuition	and	that	of	a	concept is	that	intuitions	represent	objects	by	means	of	their	tropes	while	concepts	represent objects	by	means	of	general	characteristics	which	one	or	more	objects	may	share. One thus	intuits	the	particular	greenesss	of	a	tree, in	contrast	to	thinking	of	this	particular bit	of	greeness	in	terms	of	the	predicate green, which	is	instanced	in	grass	and	mint ice-cream, among	other	things. This	account	of intuition	plays two	central roles in	Grüne's	overall interpretation. First, against	"judgment-theoretic"	conceptualist	accounts, it	presses	the	claim	that	the representational content	of intuition is importantly	different from that	of conceptual thought	or	judgment. For	this	reason	intuition	(and	thus	perceptual	experience)	cannot and	should	not	be	assimilated	to	any	form	of	conceptual	thought. This	is	an	important step	towards	vindicating	the	genetic	primacy	of	intuition	(54). Second, against	the	non-conceptualist, Grüne's	proposed	account	presses	the	importance	of	a	conceptually-guided	synthesis	in	the	generation	of	intuition	out	of	the	purely subjective	and	non-intentional	mental	states	which	arise	in	the	subject	as	it	is	affected by	external	objects. In	this	way, Grüne's	interpretation	puts	pressure	on	both	sides	of	the traditional	debate	concerning	the	(non)conceptual	structure	of	intuition	and	the	sense in	which, in	Kant's famous	phrase, "Thoughts	without content are empty, intuitions without	concepts	are	blind"	(A51/B75). In	what	follows, I present	some	issues	that	arise	concerning	various	aspects	of	this account. First, I ask	why	we	should	think	that	intuition	only	arises	as	a	product	of	synthesis	(Section	3). Second, I argue	that	Grüne's	interpretation	fails	to	account	for	one	of the	most	pressing	considerations	motivating	the	non-conceptualist	interpretation-viz., the	possibility	of	non-rational	animal	perception	(Section	4). Third, I provide	some	reasons	to	question	a	presupposition	of	Grüne's	account, namely, that	intuitions	should be	understood	as	intentional	states	which	relate	to	their	object	by	means	of	correctness conditions	set	by	their	content	(Section	5). Grüne	is	by	no	means	alone	in	accepting this	presupposition, but	I believe	there	are	both	textual	and	philosophical	reasons	for denying	that	Kant	held	such	a	view. Finally, I argue	that	Grüne's	interpretation	of	(empirical)	intuition	as	independent	of	the	existence	of	its	object	is	unconvincing	(Section 6). 3 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear 3 The	Generation	of	Intuition In	setting	up	her	triad	of	inconsistent	claims, one	central	assumption	is	that	intuition	is the	product	of	a	sensory	synthesis. Certainly, if intuition	depends	on	such	a	synthesis we	have	a	clear	question	of	the	genetic	priority	of	concepts	over	intuitions. But	if	we don't	accept	the	antecedent	then	the	issue	of	priority	is	no	longer	very	pressing, at	least for the	case	of the	existence	of intuitions in	general. So	why	should	we	accept the antecedent? Grüne	motivates	her	position	textually	and	via	broader	philosophical	argument. Textually, she	notes	that	numerous	passages	in	the	A-edition	of	the	Transcendental	Deduction	seem	to	indicate	that	intuitions	are	complex	representations	consisting	of	a	multiplicity	of	"partial"	representations	[Teilvorstellungen]	(61-2; 157, note	23). Kant	says that	"every	intuition	contains	a	manifold	in	itself"	(A99), and	that	the	drawing	of	a	line in	thought, or	the	representation	of	number	requires	that	one	"first	grasp	one	of	these manifold	representations	after	another	in	[one's]	thoughts"	(A 102). I do	not	find	these	textual	claims	convincing. Against	texts	such	as	A 102, as	Grüne herself	notes	(62), there	is	no	mention	of	intuition	but	rather	only	thought	and	thinking. If	Kant	is	making	a	phenomenological	point	here	about	the	conditions	necessary	for	the experience	of	a	line, he	is	making	an	implausible	point. As	Van	Cleve	trenchantly	puts it, When	I imagine	a	line, I am	aware	of	at	least	some	of	its	parts	together. In Kant's	view, this	can	come	about	only	through	synthesizing	those	parts	(or one's	representations	of	them). "We	cannot	think	a	line	without	drawing	it in	thought, or	a	circle	without	describing	it"	(B154). But	when	I imagine	a line, I am	aware	of	no	such	successive	generation; I simply	plop	the	whole line	down	at	once.2 Now, Kant	could	indeed	be	making	the	implausible	claim	to	which	Van	Cleve	objects, or	he	could	be	making	a less implausible	claim	concerning	the	conditions for representing	a	spatially	unified	aggregate	(e.g. perceived	spatially	adjacent	points)	as a	single	determinate	object	(e.g. a	line), which	could	then	be	utilized	in	geometrical reasoning. Kant	could	concede	that	the	experience	of	a	simultaneity	of	spatially	adjacent	points	is	possible	without	a	prior	synthesis	while	denying	that	this	is	sufficient	for the	perception	of	anything	over	and	above	this	aggregate	of	points-viz., the	line. The experience	of	an	entity	which	has	unity	over	and	above	the	phenomenological	unity	of spatial	closeness	requires	a	further	synthesis. Grüne	might	object	to	this	proposal	because	it	allows	that	there	could	be	synthesis-independent	objective	representation, and thus	intuition, but	it	seems	to	me	to	make	better	sense	of	the	various	texts	where	Kant 2 Van Cleve (1999), 86. 4 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear is	concerned, above	all, with	our	representation	of	geometric	and	arithmetical	unities in thought, without	thereby	making	what	seem	to	me	phenomenologically	implausible demands	on	perception. As for	Kant's	point	at	A99, it is	much	less	obvious	that	Kant	is	making	any	claim about	the	generation	of	intuition	from	a	synthesis	of	apprehension	once	the	line	is	put in	its	full	context. Every	intuition	contains	a	manifold	in	itself, which	however	would	not	be represented	as	such	if	the	mind	did	not	distinguish	[unterschiede]	the	time in	the	succession	of	impressions	on	one	another; for	as	contained	in	one moment, no	representation	can	ever	by	anything	other	than	absolute	unity. (A99) As	Clinton	Tolley	has	recently	noted	(Tolley (2013)), Kant	does	not	so	much	seem to	be	making	a	point	here	about	the generation of	intuition	but	rather	to	be	signaling the	difference	between having an	intuition	and representing it	to	oneself	in	thought	as a	unity. The	synthesis	of	apprehension	which	aims	at	intuition	is	thus	not	a	necessary condition	of	the	intuition's existence, but	rather	only	a	condition	of	its	being	represented as	having	a	particular	determinate	content. As	Tolley	puts	it, Kant's point here is thus that the synthesis of apprehension is required only if	we	wish to "apprehend" an intuition as containing a	particular, determinate	manifold	–	that	is, only	if	we	wish	to	have	consciousness	of	a particular	manifold	as	"contained	in	one	representation". In	other	words, while	the	synthesis	of	apprehension	"in	intuition"	is	surely	a	synthesis	that is	"aimed	at	intuition", it	is	not	at	all	one	that	makes	up	or	puts	together an	intuition, or	puts	something	"in"	intuition, in	the	first	place.3 As	Tolley further points out, Kant	argues	only that	a threefold synthesis is	necessary	for	the	consciousness	of	the	manifold	in	an	intuition-what	Kant	calls	"perception" [Wahrnehmung]. Synthesis	is	that	"through	which	perception, i.e., the	empirical	consciousness	of	[the	manifold]	(as	appearance), becomes	possible"	(B160). So	all	of	the relevant	points	Kant	makes	in	the	Transcendental	Analytic	concern	the	representation, 3 Tolley (2013), 123 5 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear in	thought, of	intuition, not	the	generation	of	intuition	itself.4 Grüne	mentions	this	passage	(161)	but	does	not	discuss	the	possibility	of	such	an	alternate	reading. She	instead takes	the	text	to	suggest	that	intuition-an	intentional	state-is generated via	synthesis from	a	complex	of	non-intentional	states. I think	that, in	order	to	get	such	a	reading	from	the	text, we	have	to	bring	Grüne's broader	philosophical	apparatus	to	bear, and	that	the	application	of	this	apparatus	is by	no	mean	obligatory. For	Grüne, intuition	is	always	the	product	of	the	unification	of quantitatively	(and	perhaps	qualitatively)	distinct	sensory	states	(64, 70, 155-8). These sensory states are, prior to synthesis, non-intentional (40, 63, 153) purely "raw"	or qualitative	feels	akin	to	pain	or	pleasure. Grüne	motivates	this	reading	in	part	by	making use	of	Kant's	distinction	between	"objective"	sensation	and	"subjective"	feeling	[Gefühl] in	the	third Critique (5:206). While	I think	she	is	right	that	Kant	makes	a	distinction between	states	that	relate	to	objects	(e.g. color, texture)	and	those	which	can	only	ever relate	to	the	subject	having	them	(e.g. pain, pleasure), I don't	see	that	this	licenses	the further	claim	that	objective	states	are contructed from	operations	on	purely	subjective ones. Certainly, such	readings	of	Kant	are	not	uncommon, and	substantive	argument against	such	a	reading	would	require	more	space	than	I can	give	it	here, but	I don't	see how	we	can	get	the	reading	out	of	Kant's	distinction	between	subjective	and	objective states.5 As	a	final	point	for	this	section	I want	to	suggest	that	Grüne's	interpretation	sits	poorly with	Kant's	characterization, in	the	Transcendental	Aesthetic, of	our	pure	intuitions	of space	and	time. I hope	that	this	is	not	unfair	to	Grüne's	overall	position, since	she	is primarily	concerned	with empirical intuition. But	I take	Kant's	argument	concerning empirical	intuition	to	be	importantly	unified	with	his	account	of	pure	intuition, and	(as others	have	argued)	his	argument	in	the	B-deduction	seems	to	depend	on	such	a	unified account.6 4 We	might	thus	distinguish	the	"synopsis	of	sense"	that	Kant	mentions	(A94, 97)	from	the	synthetic	apprehension	which	"corresponds"	to	what	is	offered	in	sense. The	synthesis	of	apprehension	runs	through and	gathers	together	this	manifold	but	needn't	be	construed	as	generating	the	intuition	itself. We	can	also see	the	distinction	between	the	intuition	and	the	representation	of	its	manifold	at	work	in	the	Axioms	of Intuition. There	Kant	distinguishes	an	intuited	appearance	from	what	must	be	true	if	that	representations is	"apprehended, i.e., taken	up	into	empirical	consciousness," while	clearly	associating	the	"synthesis" and	"composition"	[Zusammensetzung]	of	the	manifold	in	an	appearance	with	the	apprehensive	act and	not the	existence	of the	intuition	itself (B202–3) (cf. Tolley (2013), 133	note	36). Further, Kant distinguishes	between	the appearance, which	"as	intuition	is	an	extensive	magnitude," such	that	"all appearances	are	already	intuited	as	aggregates	(multitudes	of	antecedently	given	parts)"	from	the	mental act	required	for	an	appearance	to	be	"cognized"	or	"represented	and	apprehended	by	us	as	extensive" (B204). Kant	makes	a	similar	distinction	in	the	Second	Analogy	(B236). 5 Other	such	readings	include Bennett (1966); George (1981); Pereboom (1988); Van Cleve (1999). 6 For	discussion	of	the	importance	of	pure	intuition	in	the	argument	of	the	Deduction	see Longuenesse (1998); Griffith (2012). 6 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear As	is	well	known, there	are	a	variety	of	passages	in	both	editions	of	the	Transcendental	Deduction	(A99, A102, B136	note, and	B160–1)	that	have	been	taken	by	many to	show	that	the	representations	of	space	and	time	themselves	depend	on	a	synthesis by	the	understanding, or	the	understanding	operating	in	the	guise	of	the	imagination.7 According	to	Grüne, the	content	of	every	intuition	is	quantitatively	complex	because all	of	space	and	time	is	infinitely	divisible, and	the	representations	of	space	and	time must	have	a	correlative	structure	(65, 70). As	far	as	I can	tell, Grüne	thus	thinks	that	the pure	intuitions	of	space	and	time	are	infinitely	quantitatively	(though	not	necessarily qualitatively)	complex.8 Grüne	denies	(or	is	tempted	to	deny)	the	thesis	that	quantitative	complexity	is	itself the	result	of	synthesis	(155-6, and	note	18), and	correctly	points	out	that	the	extremely controversial footnote	at	B160-1	at	best	shows	that	a	synthesis is	responsible	for the status	of	intuitive	representation	as	conscious	and	objective	and	not	for	its	character	as quantitatively	complex	(156). Now, Grüne	is	mostly	concerned	with	the	apparent	problem	that	the	non-intentional status	of	unsynthesized	sensory representation	would	seem	to	entail that there is	no quantitative	complexity	prior	to	synthesis	(157).9 However, a	broader	problem	looms. On the	one	hand, Grüne's interpretation	allows	us to	makes sense	of	part	of the infamous	§26	footnote, where	Kant	says, Space, presented	as	object	(as	we	are	actually	required	to	represent	it	in geometry), contains	more	than	[the]	mere	form	of	intuition-viz. it	contains	also	the	grasping-together	[Zusammenfassung]	of	the	manifold	given according	to	the	form	of	sensibility, in	an	intuitive	representation-so	that the	form	of	intuition	gives	us	merely	a	manifold, but	formal	intuition	gives us	unity	of	representation. (B161, note) Now, since	Grüne	holds that	all relation to	an	object	depends	on synthesis, she seems	well-situated	to	argue	that	the	conditions	under	which	one	may	represent	space (and	time)	as	an	object, as	is	done	in	geometry, require	synthesis. But	I think	her	account	faces	two	problems. First, her	account	seems	unable	to	construe	the	pure	form of	intuition	as	itself	an intuition other	than	as	the	outcome	of	some	synthesis. In	order 7 See, for	example, Longuenesse (1998), ch. 8; Griffith (2012), §10. For	contrary	argument	see Tolley (2013); McLear (Forthcoming	a); Onof and	Schulting (Forthcoming). Cf. Messina (2014). 8 This	view	has	been	defended	elsewhere. See	the	notion	of	space	as	"strictly	logically	homogeneous"	in Sutherland (2004); cf. Sutherland (2006). 9 Grüne's	stance	on	the	non-intentional	status	of	sensory	representation	is, perhaps, not	entirely	stable, as	she	herself	notes	that	the	tendency	to	speak	of	the	parts	of	intuition	as	sensations	and	themselves representational, but	only	retrospectively, as	parts	of	the	intuition, is	a	vexed	issue	(cf. 158; 200, note 11). 7 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear to	avoid	this	awkwardness, Grüne	would	seem	to	need	to	collapse	Kant's	distinction between	the	form	of	intuition	(understood	as, in	the	human	case, the	pure	intuitions	of space	and	time)	and	the	"formal"	intuition	spoken	of	in	the	footnote.10 The	second, and	I think	more	pressing	issue, is	that	Grüne's	position	would	seem	to require	that	the	representation	of	space	(and	time), either	as	form	or	as	formal	intuition, is	a	synthetic	construction from	quantitatively	complex	sensory	representations. But this	goes	against	Kant's	position, in	the	Transcendental	Aesthetic, that	space	and	time cannot	be	constructed	from	any	antecedent	part. Instead, spaces	and	times	are	one	and all limitations of	the	one	space	and	one	time. Space	is	not	a	discursive	or, as	we	say, universal	concept	of	things	as	such; rather, it	is	a	pure	intuition. For, first, we	can	represent	only	one	space; and	when	we	speak	of	many	spaces, we	mean	by	that	only	parts	of	one and	the	same	unique	space. Nor, second, can	these	parts	precede	the	one all-encompassing	space, as	its	constituents, as	it	were	(from	which	it	can be	assembled); rather, they	can	be	thought	only	as	in	it. Space	is	essentially one; the	manifold	in	it, and	hence	also	the	universal	concept	of	spaces	as such, rests	solely	on	[our	bringing	in]	limitations. It	follows	from	this	that, as	far	as	space	is	concerned, an	a	priori	intuition	of	it	(i.e., one	that	is	not empirical)	underlies	all	concepts	of	space. (A245/B39; my	emphasis). The	representation	of	space	(and	time)	is, according	to	Kant, is	both	metaphysically	and epistemically	prior	to	its	represented	parts, which	are	dependent	upon	this	whole. It	is partially	because	the	representation	of	space	as	a	whole	cannot	be	built	up	out	of	a	previous	representation	of	its	parts	(particular	spaces)	that	Kant	considers	it	as	having	the status	of	an	a	priori	representation.11 Kant	characterizes	the	activity	of	the	understanding, in	contrast, as	building	representations	out	of	their	parts	via	the	process	of	running through	and	gathering	together	a	representational	manifold	(A99). So	the	activity	of the	understanding	is	always	from	part	to	whole	(CJ 5:407; cf. B72; CJ 5:251-2, 253-4). Hence, any	spontaneous	activity	on	the	part	of	the	intellect, whether	it	be	conceptual application	in	a	judgment, or	implicit	rule-governed	construction	(such	as	in	the	careful imagination	of	complex	shape), the	nature	of	the	activity	must	proceed	via	a	movement from	part	to	part, out	of	which	a	representational	whole	may	be	fashioned. If	this	is	correct	then	Kant's	arguments	in	the	Expositions	of	space	and	time	require that	the	fundamental	basis	of	our	representation	of	space	and	time	does	not	proceed 10 Such	a	collapse	is	not	unprecedented-cf. Longuenesse (1998), ch. 8. 11 I argue	for	this	and	related	points	more	extensively	in McLear (Forthcoming	a); cf. Allais (2009), 403-4. Tolley	(Tolley (2013), 133	note	38)	makes	a	related	point	that	Kant's	discussion	in	the	Deduction	seems primarily	concerned	with	the	conditions	under	which	the conceptual representation	of	space	and	time are	possible, not	with	the	conditions	under	which	space	and	time	themselves, as	pure	intuitions, are possible. 8 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear from	a	grasp	of	the	multiplicity	of	features	of	an	intuited	particular	to	the	whole	that	has those	features. Instead	the	form	of	pure	intuition	constitutes	a	representational	whole that	is	prior	to	that	of	its	component	parts	(cf. CJ 5:407-8, 409). Grüne's	interpretation	thus	faces	a	difficulty	had	by	all interpretations	which	construe	the	unity	of	intuition	as	resulting	from	an	act	of	synthesis-viz. how	we	account for	the	unity	of	space	and	time	themselves	(or	the	intuitions	thereof). I am	admittedly	extrapolating	from	Grüne's	explicit	remarks	on	this	subject, and	there	may	well	be	some way	in	which	she	avoids the	problem, but	on	its face	her	position	seems	to	entail	a fundamental	tension	between	the	argument	of	the	Aesthetic	and	the	argument	of	the Analytic. Perhaps	Kant really	did	have	such	an	inconsistent	view	at the	heart	of	his critical	system. Or	perhaps	we	should	reject	the	assumption	Grüne	(and	many	others) starts	with-viz. that	intuition	depends	for	its	existence	on	acts	of	combination	carried out	by	the	understanding	(or	the	understanding	in	the	guise	of	the	imagination). 4 The	Problem	with	Animals Grüne identifies	Kant as	distinguishing	between three	distinct kinds	of concept and their	corresponding	possession	conditions.12 They	are: "obscure"	or	"dark"	[dunkel] concepts; "clear"	[klar]	concepts; and	"distinct"	[deutlich]	concepts. A concept	expressed	by	the	predicate	"F" is obscure just	in	case	it	functions	for	the subject	solely	as	a	rule	for	sensory	synthesis. This	means	that	the	subject, by	means of F,	can	grasp	the	content	of	a	collection	of	sensory	representations	as	a	unity	(197) without	thereby	coming	to	make	any	judgment	(or	otherwise	"implicitly"	judge)	or	infer any	conclusion	(202), and	also	without	coming	to	have	a	general	representation	(in	the sense	of	a	reflected	conceptual	representation)	of	any	of	the	features	of	the	object	so represented. In	contrast, a clear concept	is	a	concept	by	means	of	which	the	subject	is	able	to classify	something	perceptually	presented	to	her. Classification	is	understood	in	terms of	the	correct	application	of	the	concept	to	the	object	in	a	perceptual	judgment	(26). Importantly, one	can	possess	a	concept both obscurely	and	clearly	(204). The	ability	to grasp	the	content	of	a	series	of	sensory	representations	as	a	unity	is	independent, and more	basic	than, the	ability	to	apply	a	concept	in	the	making	of	a	perceptual	judgment. The	latter	is	in	fact	dependent	on	the	former	(204). 12 One	central	notion	in	Grüne's	argument	which	is reasonable, though	not	explicitly	defended, is the notion	that	concept	possession	and	conceptual	representation, for	Kant, should	be	understood	in	terms of	a	capacity	(or	capacities)	of	the	subject	to do or perform certain	actions. The	tie	between	concept possession	and	the	activity	of	the	subject	is	a	reasonable	and	widespread	one. However, I think	it	might raise	trouble	for	Grüne's	view. I discuss	this	below. 9 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear Finally, a distinct concept	is	one	where	the	subject	is	in	the	position	to	infer	from the	applicability	of	a	concept F to	an	object, to	the	object's	possessing	a	series	of	other characteristics, all	the	predicates	of	which	are	contained	as	marks	in F (83).13 All	distinct concepts	are	also	clear	concepts	(98). As	noted	in	the	introduction, Grüne's	signal	contribution	to	resolving	the	inconsistent triad	of	claims	is	to	argue	that	while	obscure	concepts	are	necessary	for	the	generation of	intuitions, intuitions	are	necessary	for	the	generation	of	clear	(and	distinct)	concepts. Obscure	concepts	generate	intuitions	by	means	of	a	rule-governed	sensory	synthesis performed	on	purely	subjective	sensory	states	that	lack	any	representational	or	"intentional"	status	prior	to	their	synthesis.14 However, this	means	of	resolving	the	apparent inconsistency	between	the	three	claims	Grüne	discusses	fails	to	account	for	one	of	the central	issues	motivating	non-conceptualist	interpretations	of	Kant-viz., the	possibility of	empirical	intuition	(i.e. perceptual	experience)	in	non-rational	animals. As	multiple	interpreters	have	argued, myself	included, Kant	characterizes	the	representational	capacities	characteristic	of	sensibility	as	more	primitive	than	those	characteristic	of	the	understanding	(or	reason), and	as	plausibly	part	of	what	humans	share with	the	rest	of the	animal	kingdom.15 For	example, Robert	Hanna	construes	Kant's distinction	between	the	faculties	of	sensibility	and	understanding	as	capturing	the	difference	between	the	"sub-rational"	powers	of	the	mind	that	we	share	with	non-human animals, and	the	"rational	or	higher-level	cognitive	powers"	that	are	special	to	human beings.16 Grüne	mentions, in	a	footnote	(202-3, note	17), that	it	is	an	"interesting	question" whether	the	capacity	for	obscure	concept	possession	might	be	had	independently	of the	capacity	for	judgment	and	inference. She	suggests	that	an	affirmative	answer	would leave	open	the	possibility	that	non-rational	animals	are	capable	of	intuition, while	a negative	answer	(of	which	Longuenesse's	interpretation	is	mentioned	as	an	example) would	deny	such intuitions to	animals. As I and	others	have	noted, however, there is	significant	textual	evidence	in	favor	of	reading	Kant	as	endorsing	the	possibility	(and perhaps	even	the	actuality)	of	non-rational	animal	intuition. Kant	is	on	record	in	various places	as	saying	that	animals	have	sensory	representations	of	their	environment	(CPJ 13 An	alternate	formulation	offered	by	Grüne	states	that	a	subject	possesses	a	distinct	concept	when	she	is in	the	position	to	make	a	determinate	number	of	general	analytic	judgments	which	contain F as	subject. 14 Grüne's	reasoning	here	is	that	in	order	to	explain	how	the	schematized	categories	legitimately	apply	to the	objects	of	intuition, it	is	necessary	that	the	intuitions	themselves	be	so	constituted	as	to	allow	for such	an	application. Intuitions	do	this	in	virtue	of	the	sensations	that	constitute	them	being	synthesized in	accordance	with	the	category	(215ff). This	act	of	synthesis	is	not, nor	need	it	issue	in, a	judgment, but	is	rather	the	"primitive	capacity"	(213)	to	unify	one's	sensations	according	to	rules. 15 Kant connects the possession of a faculty of sensibility to animal nature in various places, e.g. A546/B574, A802/B830; An	7:196. 16 Hanna (2005), 249; cf. Naragon (1990); Allais (2009); McLear (2011), McLear (Forthcoming	a), §3. 10 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear 5:464; LM 28:449; cf. An	7:212), that	they	have	intuitions	(LL 24:702), and	that	they are	acquainted	with	objects	though	they	do	not	cognize	them	(JL 9:64–5).17 So	it	would be	a	significant	benefit	of	Grüne's	interpretation	if	it	not	only	resolved	the	inconsistent triad	she	started	with, but	in	such	a	way	that	allowed	for	the	accommodation	of	nonrational	perception	in	animals, and	thus	accommodation	of	a	major	motivation	of	the non-conceptualist	position. Unfortunately, however, I don't	see	how	her	interpretation	is	any	better	placed	than that	of	other	conceptualist	readings	in	allowing	the	existence	of	genuine	perceptual	intuition, as	opposed	to	mere	sensory	registration, in	non-rational	animals. Grüne	writes, It	seems	possible	to	me	that	there	could	be	a	creature	which, just	as	we do, possessed	the	inborn	capacity	to	combine	representations	according to	determinate	laws, but	which	didn't	posses	the	capacity	for	comparison, abstraction, and	reflection. Such	a	creature	could	indeed	combine	sensory	representations into intuitions, but	would	not	be in the	position to make	judgments. As	such, they	would	possess	the	categories	as	obscure concepts, without	thereby	having	the	capacity	for	judgment	[or	inference]. (203, note	17)18 Whether	or	not	such	a	creature	is	possible	(though	I am	inclined	to	agree	with	Grüne concerning	the	conceptual	point	here), I do	not	see	that	it	would	capture	non-rational animal	life	as Kant took	it	to	exist. According	to	Kant, non-rational	animals	have	merely the	capacity	for	sensory	representation	and	volition	(5:464; 7:196; 16:7; 28:117). Only the	human	being	possesses	the	capacity	for	rational	thought	and	self-consciousness	via a	possession	of	a	faculty	of understanding (7:127, 172, 196; B409). Lacking	a	faculty of	understanding, non-rational	animals	lack	the	capacity	to	combine	representations	in the	sense	which	Kant	is	concerned	with	in	the	first Critique where	he	says, [combination]	is	an	act	[Actus]	of	the	spontaneity	of	the	power	of	representation, and	since	one	must, in	order	to	distinguish	this	from	sensibility, call this	the	understanding, all	combination...is	an	action	of	the	understanding, for	which	we	would	reserve	the	general	term synthesis...(B130) 17 For	further	discussion	see Naragon (1990); Allais (2009); McLear (2011). For	some	defense	of	conceptualist	positions	that	deny	this	possibility	see McDowell (1996), chs. 3	&	6; Ginsborg (2006), Ginsborg (2008); Gomes (2014). 18 Nun	scheint	es	meiner	Meinung	nach	möglich	zu	sein, dass	es	Wesen	gibt, die, genau	wie	wir, die	angeborene	Fähigkeit	besitzen, Vorstellungen	nach	bestimmten	Gesetzen	zu	verbinden, die	aber	nicht	die Fähigkeit	der	Komparation, Abstraktion	und	Reflexion	besitzen. Solche	Wesen	könnten	zwar	sinnliche Vorstellungen	zu	Anschauungen	verbinden, wären	aber	nicht	in	der	Lage, Urteile	zu	fällen. Insofern würden	sie	über	die	Kategorien	als	dunkle	Begriffe	verfügen, ohne	die	Fähigkeit	des	Urteilens	zu	haben. 11 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear I take	it	that	Kant's	point	here	is	compatible	with	allowing	that	non-rational	animals have	the	capacity	for	association	via	exercise	of	their	reproductive	imagination	(B152; 28:277, 689-90). But	this	is	not	the	same	as	grasping	a	complex	of	sensory	representations	as	a	genuine	unity, something	that	seems	reserved	for	the	understanding	alone. And	since	Grüne	takes	such	representational	unity	as	necessary	for	intuition, and	thus objective	awareness, it	seems	that	her	account	cannot	accommodate	the	possibility	of non-rational	animal	perception, even	with	its	rather	liberal	conception	of	obscure	concept	possession.19 Of	course, this	might	be	an	interpretive	nettle	that	Grüne	is	willing	to grasp. Either	way, it	would	be	helpful	to	hear	more	about	whether	or	how	non-rational animal	perception	(and	the	various	Kantian	texts	which	appear	to	endorse	its	possibility) might	be	accommodated	by	her	interpretation. 5 The	Content	of	Intuition I want	to	now	turn	to	some	more	general	issues	concerning	the	assumption	that	intuitions	have	intentional	content. Grüne	argues	that	an	intuition	represents	its	object	via marks, and	the	marks	determine	which	object	the	intuition	represents. Intuitions	likewise	represent	their	objects	by	means	of	marks-albeit	by	so called	intuitive	marks, that	may	only	be	met	with	in	particular	objects. For this	reason	a	particular	intuition	would	then	represent	a	particular	object because	of	the	specific	intuitive	marks	the	intuition	contains	as	its	content. (53)20 Though	I do	not	believe	that	Grüne	ever	explicitly	states	her	position	in	this	manner, it	would	seem	that	she	endorses	a	version	of	what, in	the	philosophy	of	perception, has come	to	be	known	as	the	"Content	View", according	to	which	sensory	states	count	as perceptual	experiences	just	in	case	they	possess	correctness	conditions. Thus, part	of what	it	is	for	a	mental	state	to	count	as	an	experience	is	that	it	can	be	evaluated	for	its 19 I say	liberal	here	because	Grüne	seems	willing	to	characterize	possession	of	the	primitive	capacity	for grasping	a	series	of	marks	as	a	unity	in	"wholly	non-intellectual	terms"	(202, note	16). She	suggests	that the	possession	of	such	a	capacity	should	be	understood	as	the	cognitive	analogue	of	the	possession	of the	capacity	to	digest	meat	(ibid). But	if	this	is	correct, then	it	would	seem	that	we're	no	longer	talking about	spontaneity, and	thus	no	longer	talking	about	the	capacity	that, according	to	Kant, makes	the grasp	of	higher	cognitive	unities	possible. 20 Anschauungen	ihre	Gegenstände	ebenfalls	vermittels	von	Merkmalen	–	allerdings	von	so	genannten intuitiven	Merkmalen, die	nur	einem	einzigen	Gegenstand	zukommen	können	–	repräsentieren. Eine bestimmte	Anschauung	würde	dann	einen	bestimmten	Gegenstand	deswegen	repräsentieren, weil	sie bestimmte	intuitive	Merkmale	zum	Inhalt	hat. 12 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear correctness, and	the	conditions	of	its	correctness	are	determined	by	its	content.21 According	to	Grüne's	interpretation, such	content	should	be	understood	in	terms	representation	of	tropes-the	particular	instantiations	of	properties	possessed	by	spatio-temporal objects	(66, 70-1). However, Kant	seems	to	clearly	deny	that	intuitions	may	be	assessed	for	their	correctness. Correct	representation	is	a	product	rather	of	judgment. truth and illusion are not in the object insofar as it is intuited [Denn Wahrheit	oder	Schein	sind	nicht im	Gegestande, so fern	er	angeschaut wird], but are in the judgment made about the object insofar as it is thought. Hence	although it is	correct to say that the senses	do	not	err, this is so	not	because they	always judge	correctly	but	because they	do not judge	at all. Thus	both truth	and	error, and	hence	also illusion	as the	process	of	mistakenly leading to error, are to	be found	only in the judgment, i.e., only in the relation of the object to our understanding. (A293–4/B350). Here	Kant	denies	that	what	is	delivered	by	sensibility-namely	"the	object	insofar as	it	is	intuited	[angeschaut]"-consists	in	something	assessable	for	truth	or	error. Error is	a	product	of	the	relation	of	the	object	to	the	understanding-i.e. in	the	object	as	it is	judged. To	be	sure, the	senses	may	provide, in	Cartesian	phrase, the	"material"	for error. Kant	is	clear, for	example, that	errors	in	perceptual	judgment	are	due, at	least in	part, to	the	causal	influence	that	sensibility	and	its	representations	can	have	on	the understanding	and	its	judgmental	activity	(cf. A294-5/B350-1). But	this	point	doesn't entail	that	sensibility	yields	representational	states	(intuitions)	that	relate	to	an	object	by means	of	possessing	correctness	conditions. Kant	repeatedly	expresses	the	position	that	the	senses	do	not	deliver	anything	capable	of	error	in	his	anthropology	and	logic	lectures	(cf. An §11	7:146; LL 24:83ff, 103, 720ff, 825ff). Grüne	notes	the	significance	of	the	above	passage	for	conceptualist	views that	would	construe	intuition	as	a	form	of, or	otherwise	entailing, perceptual	judgment (117). But	she	does	not	consider	whether	such	texts	raise	problems	for	her	own	position. It	seems	to	me	that	they	do. If	an	empirical	intuition	contains	marks	which	determine the	object	which	it	represents, then	the	intuition	is	assessable	for	correctness	by	virtue of	this	content. Certainly, the way in	which	an	intuition	is	correct	or	incorrect	would differ	from	that	of	a	judgment, since	intuitions	and	judgments	contain	different	kinds	of marks. But	this	shouldn't	keep	intuition	from	being	assessable	for	correctness. Grüne's interpretation	of the	content	of intuition thus	seems to	stand in	serious tension	with Kant's	many	remarks	suggestive	of	a	doxastic	theory	of	perceptual	error. 21 For	more	detailed	discussion	see McLear (Forthcoming	b) 13 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear What's	more, Grüne's	view	appear	to	stand	in	deep	tension	with	one	of	Kant's	centrally	held	commitments-viz. that	in	intuition	we	prove	the	possibility	of	the	subject matter	of	our	thoughts. Kant	makes	this	point	explicitly	in	the	preface	to	the	B-edition of	CPR. To cognize an	object, it is required that I be able to	prove its possibility	(whether	by	the	testimony	of	experience	from	its	actuality	or	a	priori through	reason). But	I can think whatever	I like, as	long	as	I do	not	contradict	myself, i.e., as	long	as	my	concept	is	a	possible	thought, even	if	I cannot	give	any	assurance	whether	or	not	there	is	a	corresponding	object somewhere	within	the	sum	total	of	all	possibilities. But	in	order	to	ascribe objective	validity to such	a	concept (real	possibility, for the	first sort	of possibility	was	merely	logical)	something	more	is	required	(Bxxvi). Here	Kant	contrasts	merely	logically	possible	thought, in	which	one	brings	together logically	compossible	concepts, with	the	kind	of	real	empirical	possibility	necessary	for cognition. Kant	distinguishes	between	the	two	sorts	of	possibility	in	terms	of	the	notion of	cancellation	[Aufhebung]. The	subject	matter	of	a	thought	is	logically	possible	if	the thought's	constituent	concepts	may	be	combined	in	judgement	without	contradiction, and	thus	without	being	logically	cancelled	out	(A151/B190; NM 2:171–2). The	subject matter	of	a	thought	is	really	possible, in	contrast, if	it	can	be	shown	that	the	subject matter	to	which	the	thought	corresponds	consists	of	properties	which	are	mutually	empirically	compossible	and	not, in	Kant's	terms, "really	repugnant." Kant	often	illustrates this	idea	with	examples	involving	physical	forces	(e.g. opposite	motions, opposing	attractive	and	repulsive	forces; cf. A264–5/B320–1). Moreover, Kant	considered	a	further kind	of	repugnance, wherein	the	subject itself is	"cancelled	out". In	other	words, it would	be	impossible	for	any	being	to	exist	that	would	instantiate	such	repugnant	properties.22 In	order	for	knowledge	to	be	possible, the	demonstration	of	the	real	possibility of	the	object	of	knowledge	must	be	secured. Call	this	condition	on	proof	of	possibility	the	"Modal	Condition."23 If	experience	is to	provide	proof	of	real	possibility, and	thus	satisfy	the	modal	condition	on	thought	then it	must	have	features	which	thought	alone	does	not. If	experience	is	conceived	along	the lines	suggested	by	Grüne, what	would	those	features	be? This	is	a	particularly	pressing question	for	her	because	she	considers	empirical	intuition	and	thought	to	be	similar	in	a variety	of	ways. For	example, they	are	both	attitudes	to	content	(though	admittedly	the contents	differ	in	nature), and	the	content	in	both	cases	sets	correctness	conditions	on mental	states	that	possess	them. It	seems	clear	then	that	the	content	of	an	experience 22 See Chignell (2011), 144–5; Chignell (2014). 23 See Chignell (2011), 146. 14 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear cannot	be	simply	the	same	as	the	content	of	a	thought, otherwise	experience	would	be no	better	situated	to	satisfy	the	Modal	Condition	than	thought. The	problem	is	made	even	more	acute	by	virtue	of	the	fact	that	Grüne	denies	that intuition is, with respect to its content, dependent	on the existence	of the	object it represents. Since	the	very	same	intuition	can	be	had	whether	or	not	its	object	exists, it is	altogether	unclear	how	the	having	of	an	intuition	alone	could	ever	stand	as proof of the	real	possibility	of	the	subject	matter	of	a	thought. Some	further	condition, from	the subject's	perspective, would	need	to	be	satisfied, for	such	proof	to	be	in	the	offing. But what	would	that	be? 6 Intuition	and	Presence Even	if	we	ultimately	want	to	agree	with	Grüne's	position	on	the	content	of	intuition, there	is	a	further	claim	motivating	her	"intentionalist"	reading-viz. that	intuition	as	a mental	state	is	intelligible	independently	of	the	existence	of	its	object.24 This	"existenceindependent"	reading	of	intuition	is	argued	for	on	the	basis	of	some	of	Kant's	remarks concerning	intuition	in	cases	of	dreams	or	hallucinations	(42-3; cf. 50, note	32).25 She puts	heavy	weight, in	particular, on	Kant's	discussion	of	intuition	in	the	Refutation	of Idealism. From	the	fact that the	existence	of	outer	objects is	required	for the	possibility	of	a	determinate	consciousness	of	our	self	it	does	not	follow	that every intuitive	representation	of	outer things	[jede anschauliche	Vorstellung äuserer	Dinge] includes at the same time their existence, for that may	well	be	the	mere	effect	of	the	imagination	(in	dreams	as	well	as	in delusions)...(B278-9; cf. A376; Pr	4:290). I agree	with	Grüne	that	the	apparent	problem	presented	by	this	passage	cannot	be avoided	by	pointing	out	that	he	uses	the	phrase	"intuitive	representation"	[anschauliche Vorstellung]	rather	than	"intuition"	(42-3).26 But	it	is	not	at	all	obvious	to	me	that	Grüne's point	about	existence-independence	holds. 24 See Pereboom (1988)	for	a	similar	view. 25 See	also Roche (2011), 361	for	a	similar	worry. 26 Allais	stresses	the	"intuitive	representation"	phrase	in	her	analysis	of	this	passage; cf. Allais (2011), 395, note	16. 15 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear I take	Kant's	general	position	to	be	that	intuition	always	involves	a	presence	to	the mind	of	something.27 In	this	I believe	Grüne	and	I are	in	agreement. The	question	is whether, in	the	case	of	empirical	intuitions, the	occurrence	of	outer	empirical	intuition always	makes	present to	mind	some	actual (empirically)	mind-independent	thing. If that	particular	thing	did	not	exist	then	the	intuition	would	not	have	occurred. Grüne's	position	is	closer	to	an	"intentional	object"	reading, wherein	the	object	one intuits	is	determined	by	the	intentional	content	of	the	intuition, characterized	in	terms of the representation	of tropes. Thus, in the	case	of	hallucination, according to	her reading	of	Kant, one	grasps	as	a	unity	a	series	of	sensory	representations	(sensations) which	represent	an	object	which	is	not	in	fact	present	in	one's	environment. The	object is	only	"present"	in	the	sense	in	which	it	is	the	unity	of	the	represented	tropes	(which themselves	are	only	represented	as	existing). Grüne	thus	explains	the	sense	in	which intuitions	are	dependent	on	the	"presence"	of	an	object	in	terms	of	the	"presence"	of an intentional	object determined	by	the	content	of	the	subject's	intuition(s).28 While	I take	this	to	be	a	perfectly	coherent	position	in	itself, it	doesn't	seem	to	sit well	with	Kant's	introduction, in	the Prolegomena of	the	notion	of	intuition	in	terms	of the	presence	of	an	object	which	affects	the	subject. There	we	have	Kant's	explicit	claim that	intuition	depends	on	the	presence	of	its	object, in	a	sense	which	strongly	implies that	the	object	is	or	did	exist: How	is	it	possible	to	intuit	something a	priori? An	intuition	is	a	representation	of the	sort	which	would	depend immediately	on the	presence	of an	object. It	therefore	seems	impossible	originally	to	intuit a	priori, since then	the	intuition	would	have	to	occur	without	an	object	being	present, either	previously	or	now, to	which	it	could	relate, and	so	it	could	not	be an	intuition	(4:281-2). Kant's	framework	here	depends	on	the	interpretation	of	"presence"	[Gegenwart]	as "really	existent". This	is	why	a	priori	intuitions	are	so	problematic. How	could	there be	a	priori	intuition	which	nevertheless	depends	on	something's	presence? Kant's	solution	is	that	the	pure	intuitions	of	space	and	time	present	only	mind-dependent	objects, which	are	themselves	the	formal	conditions	of	anything	else's	(i.e. any	empirical	object) appearing. 27 Lucy	Allais	(Allais (2010))	argues	that	the	"presence-dependence"	of	intuition	is	part	of	Kant's	argument for	transcendental	idealism. She	argues	that	Kant's	notion	of	intuition	needs	to	be	understood	as	a	kind of	representation	which	involves	the	presence	to	consciousness	of	the	object	it	represents, and	that	this means	that	a	priori	intuition	cannot	present	us	with	a	mind-independent	feature	of	reality. 28 Grüne	never	quite	talks	in	this	way, but	she	does	explicitly	articulate	her	reading	in	terms	of	the	conditions	under	which	purely	subjective	states	become	"intentional	states"	(40, 104, 153	(note	8), 185-6) which	have	a	relation	to	an	object	[Gegenstandsbezug]. 16 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear If Grüne is wrong to dispute Kant's apparent construal of empirical intuition as presence-dependent, what	other	alternative	might	we	have? I suggest that there	is	a textually	plausible	alternative	way	of	reading	Kant, that	allows	him	to	explain	what	is going	on in	cases	of	dreams	and	hallucination (and thus in the	kinds	of	cases	mentioned	in	the	B278-9	passage	above)	without	thereby	denying	that	intuitions	generally depend	on	the	presence	of	their	object	(in	a	sense	more	robust	than	mere	"intentional" presence), such	that	intuitions, both	inner	and	outer, always	have	an	existing	object. First, note	that	Kant	distinguishes	between	intuition	as	the	presence	to	sensibility	of some	object, and	imagination, as	the	production	of	intuition	independent	of	any	such present	object	(cf. An	7:167). From	this	distinction	one	might	reasonably	conclude	that perhaps	intuitions, and	correspondingly, sensory	experiences, are not after	all	dependent	on	the	presence	of	the	object	they	bring	before	the	mind. Perhaps	they	are	merely self-standing	representations	which	may	or	may	not	correspond	to	some	external	object. This	would	seem	to	work	in	Grüne's	favor. But, as	Kant	goes	on	to	make	clear, a	distinction	must	be	made	between	an	"original" [ursprünglich]	or	"productive"	[productiv, dichtend]	faculty	and	one	which	is	merely "reproductive"	[reproductiv, zurückrufend]	(7:167-8).29 The	productive	imagination	is partially	responsible	for	the	a	priori	representation	of	space	and	time, while	reproductive	imagination	allows	a	subject	to	sensorily	recall	past	presentations. So	in	the	case of	perceiving	a	spatial	object in	vision	or	touch, the	empirical intuition	does	indeed depend	on	the	presence	of	that	object, as	an	object	of	outer	sense. What, at	this	point, is	unclear, is	whether	we	are	to	construe	the	imagination	of	that	object	as the	very	same kind	of	representation as	the	outer	intuition	of	the	object. It	may	be	that, in	the	case	of imagination, only	inner	sense	is	involved, and	thus	one	has	only	an inner intuition. But if	this	is	the	case	then	the	general	claim	of	presence-dependence	could	still	hold, for in	the	case	of	outer	intuition	what	is	present	is	some	spatial	object, while	in	the	case of	inner	intuition	what	is	present	is	an	image	[Bild]-a	reproduction	in	some	sense-of the	originally	perceived	object. In	order	that	Kant's	remarks	concerning	imagination count	against	his	general	claim	concerning	the	presence-dependence	of	intuition, he would	have	to	be	conceiving	of	all	empirical	intuition	along	the	lines	of	inner	intuition, and	nowhere	in	the	passage	from	the Anthropology does	he	do	this. So	it	remains	an open	possibility	that	an	outer	empirical	intuition	does	indeed	depend	on	the	presence to	mind	of	the	relevant	spatially	extended	object, despite	the	fact	that	in	the	object's absence, one	may	have	an	inner	imagined	recollection	of	it. 29 Things	are	actually	more	complicated	than	this, as	Kant's	notion	of	a	faculty	of	imagination	covers	various subfaculties, which	have	different	cognitive	roles, and	which	are	controlled	by	a	greater	or	lesser	degree by	the	will. See Satura (1971), 113-141	for	discussion. 17 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear In	a	series	of	notes	from	Kant'sNachlass he	clearly	distinguishes	between	imagination and	intuition.30 For	example, he	says, We	have two	sorts	of intuition: sensible intuition, for	which the	object must	be	represented	as	present, and	an	imagining	as	intuition	without	the presence	of	the	object. The	imagining, if	one	is	conscious	of	it	as	such, can	also	be	considered	as	inner	sensible	intuition	(18:619). Kant	further	suggests	that	the	problem	of	hallucination	is	primarily	epistemic	and doxastic-we	cannot	always tell	when	we	are	having	a	genuinely	outer intuition	or merely	the	appearance	of	one. in	this	condition	of	imagining	it	[ie. the	real	from	the	imaginary]	certainly cannot	be	distinguished, for	this	is	a	deception	of	the	power	of	judgment; but	the	question	is	properly	whether	it	cannot	be	distinguished	in	general, i.e., whether	one	cannot	be	conscious	that	the	one	is	an	intuition	of	the senses, the	other	to	be	sure	a	sensible	intuition, but	only	in	an	imagining, for	which	no	object	outside	the	representation	is	present. The	answer	is that	consciousness	can	accompany	all	representations, hence	even	that	of an	imagining, which, together	with	its	play, is	itself	an	object	of	inner	sense, and	of	which	it	must	be	possible	to	become	conscious	as	such, since	we really	distinguish	such	things	as	inner	representations, hence	existing	in time, from	the	intuition	of	the	senses	(18:621). Kant	seems	here	both	to	concede	that	imagining	cannot	be	distinguished	from	outer intuition	while, in	the	latter	part	of	the	passage	quoted, claiming	that	our	consciousness of imagined	objects is really	only	consciousness	of an inner representation-i.e. an object	of	inner	intuition. A further	point	which	seems	to	me	to	favor	the	interpretation	of	imagination	as	offering	only	inner	intuitions, and	thus	as	differing	in	form	from	intuitions	of	outer	sense, is	Kant's	claim, in	the	first	sentence, that	hallucination	and	dream	deceive	in	virtue	of	a problem	with judgment, rather	than	the	fact	that	hallucination	and	dream	are	simply	the same	type	of	representation	as	one	of	outer	sense. The	appeal	to	judgment	suggests	that the	problem	of	hallucination	is	not	a	metaphysical	one	concerning	the	identity	conditions	of	an	outer	intuition	vs. those	of	a	hallucination	or	dream, but	rather	the	epistemic problem	of	telling	the	two	kinds	of	representation	apart. A related	text, which	might	support	this	idea, occurs	in	the	B-preface	where	Kant presents	a	modification	of the	argument	of the	Refutation	of Idealism. The issue	he 30 For	discussion	of	the	notes	and	their	English	translation	see	Guyer's	discussion	in	the	Cambridge	edition of	the Reflexionen, note	81, pp. 592-3. 18 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear there	raises	also	suggests	that	the	challenge	outer	intuition	poses	is	that	it	cannot	always be	distinguished	from	inner	intuition, not	that	there	is	only	one	type	of	representation, which	may	or	may	not	occur	in	connection	with	an	outer	object. He	says, Now	which	given	intuitions	actually	correspond	to	outer	objects, which therefore	belong	to	outer	sense, to	which	they	are	to	be	ascribed	rather	than to the imagination-that	must	be	decided in	each	particular	case (Bxli; note). This	suggests	that	from	the	first-person	point	of	view	one	is	not	always	in	a	position to	distinguish	outer	from	inner	intuition. One	cannot	always	tell	whether	what	one	is experiencing	is	a	genuine	spatially	extended	object, or	merely	an	inner	ersatz	object generated	by	imagination. The	admission	of	the	possibility	of	confusing	inner	with	outer	intuition	allows	Kant	to individuate	intuition	via	the	particulars	to	which	it	relates; in	the	case	of	outer	intuitions via	spatial	particulars, in	the	case	of	inner	intuitions	via	temporally	ordered	subjective states. There	are	several	points	in	the	first Critique where	Kant	appears	to	suggest	that we	individuate	intuitions	in	terms	of	such	relations. For	example, This	consciousness	of	my	existence	in	time	is	thus	bound	up	identically with	the	consciousness	of	a	relation	to	something	outside	me, and	so	it is	experience	and	not	fiction, sense	and	not	imagination, that	inseparably connects	the	outer	with	my	inner	sense; for	outer	sense	is	already	in	itself a	relation	of	intuition	to	something	actual	outside	me; and	its	reality, as distinct	from	imagination, rests	only	on	the	fact	that	it	is	inseparably	bound up	with	inner	experience	itself, as	the	condition	of	its	possibility	(Bxl; note). Here	Kant	seems	to	be	tying	outer	intuitions	to	actually	existing	spatio-temporal	particulars	that	are	(at	least	empirically)	distinct	from	the	cognizing	subject. This	is	what distinguishes	an	intuition	of	outer	sense	from	a	merely	inner	intuition	that	might	be	generated	by	the	imagination, as	in	a	case	of	hallucination. The	contrast	Kant	makes	between	intuitions	of	spatio-temporal	particulars	(i.e. outer	intuitions)	and	inner	intuitions generated	by	imagination	suggests	that	intuitions	of	actual	spatio-temporal	particulars are	genuinely	different from intuitions	generated	by the	power	of imagination, even when	one	cannot	subjectively	discriminate	between	them. Kant	distinguishes	between genuine	experiences	and	mere	imagination	of	spatial	particulars	in	the	Refutation	as well. The	proof	that	is	demanded	must	therefore	establish	that	we	have experience and	not	merely imagination of	outer	things	(B275; original	emphasis). 19 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear Finally, in	his Anthropology of	1798	Kant	explicitly	ties	perceptual	illusion	to	a	confusion	of inner sense	with	representations	given	via outer sense. It	is	said	that	inner	sense	is	subject	to illusions, which	consist	either	in	taking	the	appearances	of	inner	sense	for	external	appearances, that	is, taking imaginings	for	sensations, or	in	regarding	them	as	inspirations	[Eingebungen]	caused	by	another	being	that	is	not	an	object	of	external	sense. So	the illusion	here	is	either enthusiasm or spiritualism, and	both	are deceptions of	inner	sense	(An	7:161; original	emphasis; cf. LA 25:61, 281, 1456).31 This	passage, and the	many	passages like it from	previous	anthropology lectures, gives	support	to	my	preferred	interpretation, for	it	takes	hallucination	and	illusion	to	be the	product	of	a	kind	of	confusion	concerning	what	is	present	or	represented, rather than	a	problem	concerning	the	representation	itself	and	its	connection	to	some	outer thing. I thus take it that	Kant's	considered	position is that	perceptual representations	of external	objects	are	not	merely	to	be	causally	distinguished	from	representations	generated	in	inner	sense, but	are	genuinely	different	representational	types	than	those	which are	the	product	of	hallucination	or	dream. Otherwise, he	would	not	need	to	repeatedly	distinguish	sensation	from	imagination, or	outer	intuition	from	inner. He	could instead	have	simply	held	that	there	is	one	type	of	representation	which	may	have	different	causes, either	external	or	internal. But	this	seems	to	be	exactly	the	position	he denies. Kant	does	not	locate	the	difficulty	of	hallucination	in	the	difficulty	of	ascribing a	single	representation	to	some	inner	vs. outer	cause. Instead, the	difficulty	is	that	we cannot	always	discern	when	we	are	having	a	genuine	perceptual	experience	of	a	spatial	particular. Instead, in	any	particular	case, we	must	rely	on	the	coherence	of	our experience	of	the	object, particularly	its	causal	coherence, with	the	other	objects	we	experience. So	the	position	I have	suggested	makes	good	sense	of	a	variety	of	texts, relies primarily	on	clear	statements	in	published	works	such	as	the Prolegomena and Anthropology rather	than	statements	in	his	notes, and	evinces	the	proper	charity	in	rendering Kant's	stated	positions	concerning	intuition	and	imagination	coherent. This	position	also	partially	undermines	Grüne's	claim	that	it	is	the	content	of	an	intuition	(understood	in	terms	of	representation	of	tropes)	which	determines	which	object it	is	"about." If	an	intuition	could	occur	in	the	absence	of	its	object	then	we	need	an account	of	how	it is that	particular intuitions	"attach" to	particular	objects. The	discussion	of	the	intentional	content	of	intuition	that	Grüne	provides	is	one	such	account. But	if	intuitions	may	be	individuated	in	terms	of	their	objects, as	on	the	account	just 31 See	also	Kant's	remarks	in	the Anthropology concerning	various	kinds	of	insanity	and	dementia	(7:21416); cf. Frierson (2009a); Frierson (2009b). 20 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear offered, then	there	is	no	issue	of	"attachment"	and	the	need	to	ascribe	to	Kant	a	theory of	intentional	perceptual	content	is	less	pressing. References Allais, Lucy 2009 "Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space", Journal of the	History of Philosophy, vol. 47, 3, pp. 383-413, DOI: 10.1353/hph.0.0134. (Cited	on	pp. 8, 10, 11.) 2010 "Kant's	Argument for	Transcendental Idealism in the	Transcendental Aesthetic", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 110, 1/1, pp. 47-75, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00279.x. (Cited	on p. 16.) 2011 "Idealism	Enough: Response	to	Roche", Kantian	Review, vol. 16, 03, pp. 375-398, DOI: 10.1017/S1369415411000197. (Cited	on	p. 15.) Bennett, Jonathan 1966 Kant's	Analytic, en, Cambridge	University	Press, Cambridge. (Cited	on p. 6.) Chignell, Andrew 2011 "Real Repugnance and Our Ignorance of Things-in-Themselves: A Lockean	Problem	in	Kant	and	Hegel", de, in Internationales	Jahrbuch des	Deutschen Idealismus	2009: Glaube und	Vernunft, ed. by	Fred Rush, Jürgen Stolzenberg, and Paul W. Franks, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 135-159. (Cited	on	p. 14.) 2014 "Kant and the 'Monstrous' Ground of Possibility", Kantian Review, vol. 19, 1, pp. 53-69, DOI: 10.1017/S1369415413000290. (Cited on	p. 14.) Frierson, Patrick 2009a "Kant	on	Mental	Disorder. Part	1: An	Overview", History	of	psychiatry, vol. 20, 3, pp. 267-289, DOI: 10.1177/0957154X08337642. (Cited on	p. 20.) 2009b "Kant on Mental Disorder. Part 2: Philosophical Implications of Kant's	Account", History	of	Psychiatry, vol. 20, 3	(Sept. 2009), PMID: 20030161, pp. 290-310, DOI: 10.1177/0957154X08337644. (Cited on	p. 20.) 21 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear George, Rolf 1981 "Kant's	Sensationism", Synthese, vol. 47, 2, pp. 229-255, DOI: 10.10 07/BF01064346. (Cited	on	p. 6.) Ginsborg, Hannah 2006 "Kant	and	the	Problem	of	Experience", Philosophical	Topics, vol. 34, 12, pp. 59-106, DOI: 10.5840/philtopics2006341/24. (Cited	on p. 11.) 2008 "Was	Kant	a	Nonconceptualist?", Philosophical	Studies, vol. 137, 1, pp. 65-77, DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9163-3. (Cited	on	p. 11.) Gomes, Anil 2014 "Kant	on	Perception: Naıve	Realism, Non-Conceptualism	and the	BDeduction", The	Philosophical	Quarterly, vol. 64, 254, pp. 1-19, DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqt019. (Cited	on	p. 11.) Griffith, Aaron M. 2012 "Perception	and	the	Categories: A	Conceptualist	Reading	of	Kant's Critique	of	Pure	Reason", en, European	Journal	of	Philosophy, vol. 20, 2, pp. 193-222, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00404.x. (Cited on	pp. 6, 7.) Hanna, Robert 2005 "Kant	and	Nonconceptual	Content", European	Journal	of	Philosophy, vol. 13, 2, pp. 247-290, DOI: 10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00229. x. (Cited	on	p. 10.) Longuenesse, Béatrice 1998 Kant	and	the	Capacity	to	Judge, Princeton	University	Press, Princeton. (Cited	on	pp. 6-8.) McDowell, John 1996 Mind	and	World: With	a	New	Introduction, Harvard	University	Press, Cambridge, MA: (cited	on	p. 11.) McLear, Colin 2011 "Kant	on	Animal	Consciousness", Philosophers' Imprint, vol. 11, 15 (Nov. 2011), pp. 1-16. (Cited	on	pp. 10, 11.) Forthcoming	a "Two	Kinds	of	Unity in the Critique	of	Pure	Reason", Journal	of the History	of	Philosophy. (Cited	on	pp. 7, 8, 10.) Forthcoming	b "Kant	on	Perceptual	Content", Mind. (Cited	on	p. 13.) 22 Stefanie	Grüne's Blinde	Anschauung Colin	McLear Messina, James 2014 "Kant	on	the	Unity	of	Space	and	the	Synthetic	Unity	of	Apperception", Kant-Studien, vol. 105, 1, pp. 5-40, DOI: 10.1515/kant-2014-0002. (Cited	on	p. 7.) Naragon, Steve 1990 "Kant	on	Descartes	and	the	Brutes", Kant-Studien, vol. 81, 1, pp. 1-23. (Cited	on	pp. 10, 11.) Onof, Christian	and	Dennis Schulting Forthcoming "Space	as	Form	of Intuition	and	as	Formal Intuition. On	the	Note to B160 in	Kant's Critique	of	Pure	Reason", The	Philosophical	Review. (Cited	on	p. 7.) Pereboom, Derk 1988 "Kant	on	Intentionality", Synthese, vol. 77, 3, pp. 321-352, DOI: 10. 1007/BF00869290. (Cited	on	pp. 6, 15.) Roche, Andrew F. 2011 "Allais on Transcendental Idealism", Kantian Review, vol. 16, 03, pp. 351-374. (Cited	on	p. 15.) Satura, Vladimır 1971 Kants	Erkenntnispsychologie	in	den	Nachschriften	seiner	Vorlesungen über	Empirische	Psychologie, 101, Bouvier, Bonn. (Cited	on	p. 17.) Sutherland, Daniel 2004 "Kant's	Philosophy	of	Mathematics	and	the	Greek	Mathematical	Tradition", The	Philosophical	Review, vol. 113, 2	(Apr. 2004), ArticleType: research-article	/	Full	publication	date: Apr., 2004	/	Copyright	©	2004 Duke	University	Press, pp. 157-201. (Cited	on	p. 7.) 2006 "Kant	on	Arithmetic, Algebra, and	the	Theory	of	Proportions", Journal of	the	History	of	Philosophy, vol. 44, 4, pp. 533-558, DOI: 10.1353/ hph.2006.0072. (Cited	on	p. 7.) Tolley, Clinton 2013 "The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach", Kantian	Review, vol. 18, 01, pp. 107-136, DOI: 10.1017/ S1369415412000313. (Cited	on	pp. 5-8.) Van Cleve, James 1999 Problems	from	Kant, Oxford	University	Press, Oxford. (Cited	on	pp. 4, 6.)